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THE PROBLEM
What is the impact of combat on aircrew work/rest schedules and fatigue?

FINDINGS
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For 2 weeks during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 12 A-6 aviators and 11 F-14
aviators from CARRIER AIR WING ONE (CVW-1) aboard the USS AMERICA (CV-66) compklted
detailed daily-atvy lop wh their squadrons conducted operations from the Red Sea. Subjective
measures of figue, quality of rest, and sleep need were also collected.
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Both squadrons flew frequently at night during Desert Storm without sigificant deep problem or
substantial fatigue from deep loss, although the aviators generally desired more sleep. Evidently, combat did

not induce serious sleep problems or associated fatigue in the sampled aircrew. A likely contributing factor
was the large number of assets b~rought to the combat theater, which allowed workload to be shared and
activity and rest times to be properly managed.
Raster plots of awake, sleep, and flying periods suggest an additional contributing factor to the
relative lack of fatigue and sleep problems. The AMERICA travelled eastward from the cast coast through
seven time zones and became involved in combat shortly after arrival in the Red Sea. This pattern of travel
may have given AMERICA's aircrew flying at night a significant advantage over other aircrew already
operating in the area for a longer period. If the circadia clocks of AMERICA's aircrew bad not fully
adapted to local time on arrival in the Red Sea, but were operating closer to Eastern Standard T'ime (EST),

then night flights occurring at 0300 local time (2000 EST) were closer to being evening flights on the body's
internal time. These aircrew may not have been experiencing troughs in their circadian cycles during these
local nighttime flights, at least for the early part of the war. This would result in less sleepiness and a
significantly smaller physical challenge to overcome. This situation would likely not hold for aircrew who had
been in the region for longer periods, nor would it occur for future conflicts closer to the originating time
zone.
RECOMMENDATIONS
We recommend that military planners incorporate into battle strategy, when possible, information
about the circadian phase of combatants. Proper deep logistics and sleep management will better prepare
combatants to fight effectively at suboptimal time,. Where it is desirable to have combatants synchronized to
a sleep/wake schedule differev't from that of the local time zone (eg., in order to fight exclusively at night),
more effective means of shifting 0',e phase of the circadian pacemaker are required. We recommend
additional applied research into the fe.%sibility of bri.ht light and pharmacologic treatments to phase-shift
combatants.
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INTRODUCTION
The maintenance of adequate levels of human performance during wartime is a major concern of

the military. Military planners realize that the inevitable stresses, fatigue, and related consequences of war
may negatively affect cognitive functioning and zlertness. In order to counteract the effects of stress, fatigue,
and sleep deprivation, one must understand the relation between these variables and performance. Various
studies and reviews of the literature (1-5) show that this relation is complex and involves factors ranging from
characteristics of the individual (e.g., restednes skill level, motivation, attention, stamina, age, temperament,
personality, intelligence) to task variables (e.g., type, complexity, duration, pacing, repetitiveness) and the
environment (e.g., temperature, altitude, noise, vibration, and acceleration). Unforunately, few of these
factors arz modifiable under combat conditions. Of the factors over which military commanders have some
control, adequate rest and deep are acknowledged to be critically important in maint2anin performance
(4,6-8). Research has shown that with sleep loss both mood and performance in operational situations can
degrade on a variety of tasks (9-13).
Performance degradation from inadequate sleep will express itself in different ways for different

combatants because of the variety of tasks they perform. For ground troops involved in sustained or
continuous operations, performance decrement would include shooting accuracy and weapons handling (14).
For naval aviators, performance degradation might take the form of a reduced ability to a) detect the enemy,
b) make split-second decisions correctly, c) drop bombs on ta-get, d) fly the aircraft expertly, or e) land
safely on the carrier. There have been many attempts in the laboratory and field to document aviation
performance degradation as a function of stress, fatigue, and skep deprivation. Results have been mixed.
For example, Fraser (15) showed significant vigilance degradation in aircrew after long flights, while Haslam
(14) also detecte vigilance degradation with seep loss. Storm (16) demonstated that performance in a
simulator was significantly degraded for transport crews given only onboard rest after flying 8-9 h missions.
In a study of the sleep of carrier pilots off Vietnam, Brictson, et al. (17) found that the inter-sleep interval of
the pilots was more variable than that of nonflying personneL The more variable the interval, the more
likely a landing error (R - -.762, 2 < .05). Nonetheless, the magnitude of performance degradation after
partial, or even total, sleep deprivation is often small (4,18). Furthermore, subjective feelings of fatigue can
be inconsistent with performance (1), even exhibiting a greater sensitiviýy to sleep loss (14).
Several possible reasons could account for the frequently sal magnitude of performance changes
following sleep loss. First, compensatory efforts may sere to keep task performance high, temporarily
overcoming the effects of sleep deprivation ou task performance (4). Second, traditionai accuracy measures
(e.g., false alarm or error rate) may not be the appropriate ones for detecting performance changes. It is
errors of omission that frequently increase with fatigue (3). /As long ago as 1943, Bartlett (19) demonstrated
how atlention narrows and the variability of response latencies incareases with fatigue. In other words,
performance might be generally good, with interspersed periods of response lapses or failures. These lapses
are not dearly reflected in accuracy rates. Third, subjects may compensate in ways that are too subtle to
detect with traditional measure,. For example, the Choice of Probability and Effon (COPE) model of
Holding (1) predicts that fatigued subjects will make more risky choices when given the opportunity. In two
recent studies in our laboratory using a simulated long-range attack scenario (20,21), fatigued subjects
performed in a manner consistent with this model. That is, subjects appeared to exchange a higher failure
rate for a savings in time. Rcvardlcss of the specific way in which performance degrades with sleep loss (and
the difficulty in documenting the degradation), there is agreement on the importance of adequate sleep
management and sleep logistics for military troops in wartime (4,6,7). Furthermore, while research oa rest,
sleep, and performance can be performed in both laboratory simulations and field exercises, the only way to
obtain a dear and ace-urate picture of sleep and fatigue under combat conditions is to collect data during
actual combat. For naval aviators, this means collecting data while they are involved in carrier combat
operations.

The role of many naval aviators during combat is unique. They frequently spend many hours (even
days) planning in detail the mis6ons they will fly. This can lead to partial sleep deprivation before the first
launch. After being "front-loaded" in this manner with fatigue, the aircrew fly high-performance aircraft

requiring periods of peak alertnes and concentratioe.
According to pilots, foremost among thes Periods is
the carrier laniding, To make miatters worse, the landing may come at the end of a long. arduous flight, at
night and in bad weather. The margin for error is small and the penalty extreme. Consuently, anyinsight
into the effect of combat on fatigue and work/rest cycles is a valuable first step ian the pursuit of appropriate
countermeasures and strategie to aid the aviator.
Although difficulties in obtaining adequate rest are not always tightly linked to performance
degradation, they are an indicator that a potentially serious problem exists. Furthermore, the time of day
when aviators sdeep and fly has been shown to play an important role in aviation mishaps (22). The front.1oading of fatigue by involving aviators in many hours of pre-flight planning could serve to reduce their
readiness and effectiveness. To examine the impact during combat of many of thes variables, we euamined
the work/rest shedules of two carrier-based squadrons during parts of Operations Desert Shield and Stor.
The purposes of the study were to provide an in-depth eamination of the work/rest schedules of naval
aviators in combat and to collect data on subjective fatigue and sleep problems. This report is a first step in
the process of documenting fatigue-related problems before exi-ni-ng countermcasures. The information
should be of value ian adding to the growing data base (6,7) needed to make appropriate recmmensdations
on military sleep management.
MATERIALS AND MEfMODS
4

SUBJECTS
A total of 4A respondents from CVW-1 volunteered to participate in the study. Eighteen officers
participated from t!w A-6 Intruder squadron (VA-85 Black Falcons) and 23 from one F-14 Tomcat squadron
(VF-I02 Diamoudbacks). The A-6 squadron was chosen because of interest expressed by the Naval Strike
Warfare Center regarding the effects of mission planning on attack aircrew readiness. The F-14 squadyon
was added because of the anticipated heavy role of fighters in the war. All subjects received a full briefing
on the purposes of tie study and assurances as to the anonymity and confidentiality of the data. Initial
volunteers represented between one-third and one-half of the squadrons' officer contingents.
After the study began, many subjects either chose to withdraw, failed to return seep/activity logs, or
failed to complete them propery. Only subjects who contributed an adequate quantity of data are included
in the following analyses. The final results are therefore based on a total of 23 respondents: 12 A-6 and 11
F-14 aircrew. ThU six pilots and six bombardier/navigators (B/Ns) from the A-6 squadron ranged in age
from 24 to 37 years (_M_
- 29_5, SD - 4.0). The five pilots and six radar intercept officers (RIOs) from the
F-14 squadron ranged in age from 25 to 39 years (LM 29.4, D = 4.4). The distribution of efficer ranks
and designators for both squadrons is provided in Table 1.
MISSION TASKING
The A-6E Intruder is a carrier-based, all-weather, low-level, attack bomber that is capable of
nighttime operations. It is configured with two side-by-side seats for pilot and bombardier/navigator. Its
primary missions during the Persian Gulf War were long-range strikes and in-flight tanking. The F-14
Tomcat is a carrier-based, all-weather, multi-role fighter. The F-14 is also a two-seat aircraft, but with pilot
and RIO seated in tandem. Its primary missions during the Gulf War were fighter escort, tactical air
reconnaissance, fighter support of strikes, and combat air patrol Additional details regarding the specific
missions flown by these squadrons during this study can be found in a related report (24).

'This is not unusual in this type of research. In a similar study with nuclear submarine crews, about onethird of the men initially volunteering for the study were not included in the data analyses for similar reasons
(23).
2

Table 1. Rank and Designator of Study Subjects.
A-6

F.14

Rank

Pilot

B/N

Pilot

RIC'

LTJG

0

1

0

2

LT

5

3

3

1

LCDR

1

2

1

2

CDR

0

0

0

1

Total

6

6

5

6

ISTRUMT
We used a combination sleep log and activity-survey card (FAg, 1) after Hartman & Cantrell (25),
Storm (16), and Naitoh, et a (26) to coUet data. Log of this type can be used to predict task performance

and mood (23) and have been shown to produce reliable sleep measures (26). The seep/activity log at the
top of the form enables aircrew to record their daily sleep and work activitits using the key provided. One
modification that we made was to customize a set of codes (Table 2) for those activities typically performed
by aviators on aircraft carriers Five additional questions on the lower part of the card pertained to sleep
quality, readines to fly another strike mission and consumption of caffeine. The question concerning flight

readiness is addressed in detail in our companion report (24).
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Figure 1. The Sleep Log/Activity Survey Card used in the study.
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Table 2. Sleep Log/Ativity Survey Code Definitions.
Code

Deflition

Alert

Alert flight status, ready to h-unch in relativ-zly short time period

Sleep

Time actually asleep

meals

Eating

Flight

Time airborne in the aircraft

Brief

Time spent briefing for the upcoming flight

Debrief

Time spent debriefing after completion of a flight

Collateral Duties

All offical duties odher than flight-rdated activities

Strike Paning

Tume spent planning the upcoming mission(s)

Recreation/Reat

Time not flying or working on other official duties

GQ/Drills

Time spent at General Quarters or duties associated with othfr drills

Exercise

Time spent exercising in stateroom or snall workout area

Testing

Not used

PROCEDURES
Work/rest schedules and subjective sleep-related data were collected aboard USS AMERICA (CV66) from 3 January through 4 February 1991. The ship departed Norfolk, Virginia, on 28 December 1990
and arrived in the Red Sea on 16 January 1991. Because the war began in the early morning hours of 17
January (local time), this resulted in about 2 weeks of data collection during Operation Desert Shield and 2
weeks during Desert Storm. Subjects completed a separate card for every day in which they participated in
the study, for a maximum of 33 d. Subjects filled in the blocks using the 11 categories listed on the card.
Given the 48 blocks per day, this provided a potentially continuous record of daily activity to a resolution of
one-half hour.
In its eastward travel, the ship crossed seven time zones. Ship time was reset to local time at 0200
after crossing each meridian; 1 h was lost each time the docks were set ahead. The seven time zones were

crossed in about 2 weeks. Once on station, the USS AMERICA conducted cyclical operations in tht Red
Sea by generally spending severa days in a row conducting air strikes followed by a day c. two refuelling and
resupplying.

RESULTS
The results desciribed here pertain only to the work/rest schedules of the aviators and the subjective
measures of sleep quality. For a detailed analysis of the mission and flight data and its relationship to
subjective aircrew readiness swe Shappell & Neri (24). The work/rest cycle and sleep quality data have be,analyzed descriptively. Formal measures of statistical significance were not applied to the data because field
studies of this type are inherently moexpcrimental, precluding the proper use of many traditional statistical
tests. Despite this limitation and the relatively small sample size, we believe that the sample was
representative of the population of A-6 and F-14 aviators on the AMERICA. Moreover, the detailed nature
of the data and the unusually long period over which it was collected provide a rare look at the work, rest,
and sleep patterns of naval aviators during combat.

4

The data arc presented and described sarately for A-6 and F-14 aircrew. This enables the
examination of differences in trends between these two communities with their different missions and tasking.
Data are also broken down by Desert Shield and Storm to examine the impact of the war on the numerous
measures. One of the major effects of combat on naval aviators is the flying of combat missions, particularly
at night. Therefore, the various sleep- and fatigue-related measures are frequently described in this paper as
a function of the type of flight that occurred that day. Day flights are defined as those occurring during the

normal work day (0600-2400). This is somewhat unconventional as many flights occurred afmr sunset but
were still considered oday" flights. Night flights are defined as those having any portion occurring between
2400 and 0600, delaying normal sleep onset.
ANALYSIS OF DAILY ACTIVITIES

Data from the sleep/activity kV are grouped by activity type and shovi separately for A-6 (Fq;. 2)
and F-14 aircrew (Fig. 3). Both figures show the distribidion for an *average" day during Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. The codes that compri?: the categories in the figures are gi*e in Table 3. For some of the
activities in Figs. 2 and 3 (e.g., flight, other flight) the averages include days on which some aircrew did not

participate in the activity. Thus, the amount of flying in the average day does nr equate to average flight

duration, because many aircrew did not fly on any given day. On the other hand, since most aircrew slept
every day, the amount of sleep in the average day will correspond more dlosey to average total sleep
duration. Major sleep period and nap durations are discussed later in this paper; a detailed discussion of
flight duration and other flight-related data may be found in our companion relxpt (24).

Table 3. Codes Comprising the Categories Used in
Figures 2 and 3.
Category

Code(s)

Sleep

Sleep time, including naps

Other rest

Reg, meals, & exercise

Ffigt

Flight time

Other flight

Brief, debrief, alert

Collateral duties

Collateral duty time

Other work

Planning. GO/drills

M

Missing data

g

For the A-6 aircrew (Fig. 2), total work time (fright, other flight, collateral duties, and other work)
constituted 11.6 h of the typical day during Desert Shield. Aircrew obtained a normal amount of sleep (73
h) while flying 1.7 h, on average. They committed 4.3 h to flight-related activities (flight and other flight)
and typically worked about 5 h per day on collateral duties. During Desert Storm, total work time decreased
very slightly to 11 h in the average day, although the average amount of unaccounted for (missing) time
increased by over I h. Sleep time remained steady while rest time decreased by about a half-hour per day.
The biggest changes were in flight and collateral duty time, shown as exploded pie slices. Flight time in the
average day increawei 71% to almost 3 h, with total flight-related activities increasing 37% to 5.9 h.
Collateral duty time decreased by more than half to 2.2 h.
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The pattern of work, rest, and sleep activities was fairly similar for F-I 4 aircrew (Fig. 3). Total work
time averaged 11.9 h in the typical day during Desert Shield. Aircrew obtained the same amount of sleep
(7.3 h) as A-6 aviators and averaged the same amount of flight time (1.7 h). (Again, this number bears no
relation to duration of the average flight.) Flight-related activities were more time-consuming in the average
day than for the A-6 aircrew, at 5.9 h, while collateral duty time was similar, aW4.6 h. During Desert Storm,
total work time in the average day decreased almost 2 h to 10.1 h, with the amt unt of missing time

remainingabout the same. Sleep and rest tine each increased by about an h1,= per day. Relativy large
change again occurred in flight time and collateral duties for an average day durIg Desert Storm. Flight
time increased 35% to 2.2 h. Total flight-relate activities actually decreased 8% to 54 h due to a decrease
in the other flg activities of befing debriefing. and alert. Finally, collateral duty time iW- d 24%, or
almost a hour.
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One of the most bas seep-related questions that can be asked about the aarrew

in
studyuis OMw
times w=e hepy ei
A traditiofal way to analye sleep data of this sartis to
plot the sleep fraction (27). Sleep fraction is the percentage of aircrew repoiting they were asleep at any
given time of day and has been previously used to describe operational data collected with sleep logs (26).
Sleep fractious for A-6 and F-14 aircrew are shown in Figs. 4 and 5, respectively.
The data in Flgs. 4 and 5 are plotted separately for sleep periods before days with no flights and
daytime fi*gt Sleep fraction data are plotted for periods mmediately foilowing nighttime flight The
latter sleep periods were delayed because of the flying. Day flights and night flights were defined above.

Days without flying serve as a baseline for comparing the effects of day and night flights. Thus, any
displacement in the daytime-flying and nighttime-flying curves (relative to the noaflying curves) in Figs. 4 and

5 represents a change in sleep fraction as a result of operational tasking.
Separate curves are shown for Desert Shield and Storm in Figs. 4 and 5. The figures lack night

flight curves for Desert Shield because flights were too few to result in meaningful data. The notchds in the
two Desert Sh'eld curves in each figure are due to time zone changes. As mentioned previously ship docks
were advanced 1 h at 0200 each time a meridian was crowed. Because sleep logs were filled out using local
tme, there are less data for the 0200-0300 time period. For the purposes of this data presentation, the notch

is an artifact and the curves can be considered smooth. (The impact of the changes in time zones will be
further explored in the discussion.) Both local and Eastern Standard Time (EST) are shown along the
absci-sa for the Desert Storm data. The ship started from the EST zone. The local time scale incorporates
the clock resettings. Ouly local time is shown for Desert Shield data because of the continually changin
local time and therefore a continually changing difference between local time and EST.
For A-6 aircrew during Desert Shield, the sleep fraction before days with no flying is depicted by the
solid line in the left panel of Fig. 4. Sleep fraction peaked at approximately 0400. Before days with day

flights, sleep fraction followed a similar pattern, with the exception of aircrew apparently rising earlier,
presumably to brief and launch. This change is indicated by the small leftward displacement after 0400 of
the daytime-flying curve relative to the solid curve. During Desert Storm, A-6 aircrew showed a somewhat
similar pattern for nonflying days. Day flights resulted in a shift to earlier sleep onsets the previous night as
well as earlier awakenings. This is indicated by a leftward displacement of the entire daytime flying curve
relative to the solid curve. Napping appeared to increase at about 1400 (evidenced by the slight bump in the
daytime-flying curve). Night flights led to a predictably large shift to later sleep onset and wake times. Note
that over 90% of night fliers were asleep at 0800 and about 40% were still sleeping at noon. We found no

evidence of increased napping following the night flights.
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The sleep-fraction pattern for F-14 aircrew during Desert Shield was similar to that of A-6 aircrew
before nonflying days (Fig.5, left panel). Harvever, sleep fraction before day flights differed in two ways from
the A-6 data. First, there was a slightly greater shift toward earlier sleep onset times. Second, the bump
around 1230 on daytime-flying days represents more napping than for the A-6 aircrew. During Desert

Storm, sleep fraction was similar to the A-6 pattern before nonflying and daytime-flying days but differed
after night flights. The increase in bandwidth indicates more variability in the sleep pattera, with a similar
rate of sleep onset but 40% of the aircrew still reporting sleep as late as 1400.
These sleep fraction data can provide only hints about average sleep onset and duration times.
Sleep onset for the major sleep period is further quantified in Fig. 6. Sleep episodes separated by Y2 h or
more were considered different sleep periods. Naps are analyzed separately. The patterns are very similar
for both squadrons. Mean sleep onset times during Desert Shield were fairly late, between about 0100 and
0130. During Desert Storm, sleep onset times on nonflying days were delayed to about 0?M0 for both
squadrons but remained between 003r" and 0130 before days with daytime flights. Predictably, night flights
during Desert Storm delayed mean sleep onset times to about 0500 local timz. However, this corresponded
to 2200 EST, a fact that will be considered later.
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Figure 6. Mean sleep onset times (+ I SEM) for A-6 and F-14 aircrew before days with no flights
and day flight-, and on the days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.

The major sleep periods can be examined both in terms of average length and variability. Average
duration provides clues as to whether subjects are obtaining adequate quantities of sleep, however, variability
in sleep duration is one measure of how fragmented a sleep/wake schedr.e has become. Even with a stable
average duration, a substantial increase in variability indicates that the major sleep period may be critically
snort for a sizcable portion of 'be sample. Sleep duration frequency histograms for the major sleep period
are shown in Fig. 7 for A-6 aircrcv and Fig. 8 for F-14 aircrew. The A-6 data show that, during Desert

Shield, nearly all sleep periods were 4-10 h. The median durations were 6.0 h before nontlyiag days and 6.75
h before daytime-flying days. During Desert Storm, the frequency of major sleep period durations under 4 h
before nonflying and daytime-flying days increased trghtly. Relative to Desert Shield, median sleep length
increased, however, to 7.5 h before nonflying days. It decreased by I h to 5.75 h before daytime-flying days,
with no change in variability. After night flights, median sleep duration was 6.5 h.
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A similar pattern is present for F-14 aircrew (Fig. 8). Before nonflying days during Desert Shield,
median sleep length was 7 h compaLred to 6 h for A-6 aircrew. Unlike v.ith A-6 aircrew, median duration
decreased to 5.75 b before day flights. Again, almost all sleep periods wer 4-10 h long. During Desert
Storm, median sleep duration before nonflying days climbed to 8.5 h, with a substantial increase in the
number of sleep periods in ezcess of 10 h. Median duration increased to 7.0 h before day flights and was 6.5
h after night flights.
An analysis of mean sleep duration paints much the same picture as the frequency histograms. For
ease of womparison, mean values for both A-6 and F-14 aircrew were plotted together (Fig. 9). Before the
war, average sleep duration typically varied betweea 6 and 7 h for both squadrons. During the war, both
squadrons increased slightly to 7-8 h sleep on nights before nonflying days. Average sleep duratio-a (6-7 h)
before day flights and after night flights during the war did not vary substantially from sleep durations before
the war.
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Figure9. Mean sleep duration (+ I SEM) for A-6 and F-14 aircrew before days with no flights and
day flights, and on the days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.
Sirty Problems. Given the pattern of sleep for aircrew described above, one might ask "What
problems, if any, did aircrew have sleeping?" The data provide several ways of obtaining an answer.
Questions 2, 3, and 4 on the sleep/activity logs (Fig. 1) relate to sleep difficulty. The responses to these
subjective questions were assigned i iierical values, which were averaged for the different flight conditions
during Desert Shield and Storm. The results are presented in Figs. 10 and 11 for A-6 and F-14 aircrew,
respectively.
Question 2 asked "How much trouble did you have sleeping during this period?" The five possible
responses ranged from "none" to did not sleep." The A-6 aircrew (Fig. 10 upper left panel) reported little
difficulty sleeping both before and during the war. Average responses for all conditions were about midway
between "none"and "slight." Sleep before day flights during Desert Storm was reported to be a little more
difficult than under the other conditions. Question 3 asked "How rested did you feel upon awakening during
this period?" Restedness followed a pattern similar to sleep trouble, with average responses fluctuating
around "moderately"rested (Fig. 10 top right panel). Restednesss decreased slightly before day flights during
the war, consistent with the sleep trouble results. Question 4 asked "Do you feel like you could have used
some more sleep?" On the average, subjects reported need for additional sleep 60-70% of the time before

11
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the war (Fig. 10 bottom right panel). This number dropped below 50% during Desert Storm for nonflying
days, but it increased to over 70% for daytime-flying days. Need for additional sleep was reF.ted 65% of
the time for sleep episodes foUowing night flights. In sum, for the A-6 aviators, sleep before day flights
during Desert Storm was the least restful and the most problematic.
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Figure 10. Mean sleep trouble, restedness, and sleep need (+ I SEAP) for A-6 aircrew before days
with no flights and day flights, and on days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.
The F-14 aircrew showed a tendency to report slightly more trouble sleeping than the A-6 aircrew
during Desert Shield (Fig. 11, top left panel). During Desert Storm, sleep trouble remained between none
and slight, with the most trouble before day flights. Like their A-6 counterparts, the F-14 aircrew generally
reported being moderately rested (Fig. 11, top right panel). However, during the war, sleep after night
flights was the least restful, although no worse than sletp before day flights during Desert Shield. The need
for additional sleep was reported 60% of the time during Desert Shield for episodes prior to nonflying days,
and about 75% of the time before day flig ýs (2ig 11, bottom right pancl). During the war, the perceived
need for more sleep dropped to about 50% of the responses for sleep periods preceding nonflying days.
Desire for mo:e sleep before day and after night flights did not exceed about 60% of responses during the
war. Thus for the F-14 aviators, sleep associated with flying during Desert Shield and Storm was slightly
more troublesome and less restful than sleep before nonflying days.
On result of difficulty sleeping or poor quality of sleep is the need to take naps. Nap frequency
and duration are shown in Figs. 12 and 13, respectively. Naps are defined as sleep periods that are separated
by at least /2 h from the major sleep period. The data shmwn in these figures are consistent with the data
indicating naps in Figs. 4 and 5, discussed earlier. For A-6 aviators, nap frequency was abou: 1 nap every 3 d
(.3 naps per day), with the exception of days with day flights during Desert Storm (Fig. 12). Then naps
occurred on an average of every other day. It should be noted that naps after night flights during the war
were not as easy to take because sleep periods were already extending weU into the normal workday. The F14 aircrew also showed more frequent napping after day flights, but only during Desert Shield During
Desert Storm, the most frequent napping was on days with no flying.
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Figure 11. Mean sleep trouble, restedness, and sleep need (+ 1 SW.l) for F-14 •circew before days
with no flights and day flights and on days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.
The nap duration pattern (Fig. 13) is remarkably similar to the nap frequency pattern for A-6
aviators. Not only were naps more frequent after day flights during Desert Storm, they were also longer,
avaraging about 1.3 h. Naps under other conditions averaged closer to .6-.8 h iL duration. For F-14 aviators,
the nap duration pattern did not follow the nap frequency pattern as closely. Naps following day fights
before the war were the longest at about I h. Naps on nonflying days before the war and under all
conditions during the war were shorter at .4-.8 h.
A less direct measure of difficulty sleeping or sleep quality is caffeine ingestion. Patterns of caffeine
use are shown in Fig. 14 for both A-6 and F-14 aircrew. The data were obtained in answer to question 6:
"How many cups of coffee or caffeinated soft drinks did you ingest durig
ft
period?" The average
consumption for A-6 aviators was about 2 cups per day throughout Desert Shield and Storm. The F-14
aviators drank more cdffeinated drinks, avert :.ing 3-4 cups per day, Most caffeine was ingested on nonflying
days during Desert Shield and on days with iy flights during Desert Storm, Nap duration and caffeine use
are interesting to examine together. Shorter nap durations are associated with greater caffeine use and vice
versa. This relationship is particularly strong for the F-14 aircrcw as seen in the complete reversal of the
pattern of results in the right panels of Figs. 13 and 14. Not surprisingly, caffeine may have served to
shorten c, limit sleep during the day.
DISCUSSION
For the A-6 and F-14 aviators sampled by this study, the effect of combat on work/rest cycles and
sleep-related fatigue was modest. Nevertheless, we emphasize that these findings are specifc to these two
squadrons on the AMERICA. The circumstances of the AMERICA's travel to the Red Sea are not
necessarily generalizable to other aircraft carriers involved in the war, except the USS THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, which left Norfolk enroute for the Persian Gulf a day earlier.

13

NAP FREQUENCY

one"
Olmw

F-14

A-6

wowf

0.5

0.8

OA

- .

0.2

0.2

FigwRe 12. Mean naps per day (+ 1 SEM) for A-6 and F-14 aircrew during days with no flights and
day flights, and on days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.

NAP DURATION
- 2A

A

A-6

F-14

t

~

I0A

c-t0.5,

0 ,
00

0.0O~

£50.0

04*

n

MIY DOWmaw~l

NW(C GAY

FLIGHT TYPE

00E

OONlo

FLIGHT TYPE

Figpre 13. Mean nap duration (+ 1 SEM) for A-6 and F-14 aircrew during days with no flights and
day flights, and on days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.

CAFFEINE USE
A-6

F-14

I

I
C

r

t."rv

-

2

2:<'

F'IGHT TYPE

FLIGHT TYPE

Figure 14. Mean cups caffeinated drinks consumed/day (+ 1 SEM) by A-6 and F-14 aircrew on
days with no flights and day flights, and on days after night flights during Desert Shield and Storm.
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The main effect of the war on the patterning of activities throughout the day was, predictably, an
increase in flight time for both squadrons, and other work- and fligh!-related activities for the A-6 squadron
(Figs. 2 & 3). At the same time, collateral duty time decreased, possibly because collateral duty tasking
diminished with the onset of the war. Certainly commanding and executive officers were more heavily
involved with planning, possibly leaving the more junior officers (the subjects of this study) with additional
free time. Whatever the reason, the reduction in collateral duty time rather than any significant reduction in
sleep time is an indicator of good sleep managemeat. Further indication of proper sleep management is the
fact that during the war the amount of sleep in the average day remained the same for the A-6 aircrew and
increased by 1.9 h for the F-14 aircrew. The increase in sleep and rest for the F-14 squadron may be related
to the lighter-than-anticipated role of these fighters during the war. This would probably not be the case in a
different wartime scenario with the airborne threat lasting longer than it did here. The relatively large
increase in missing data for the A-6 aircrew is puzzling, It may be related to war-induced stresses and
demands on these attack aircrew, which resulted in the sacrifice of nonessential tasks such as completion of
sleep/activity logs. The percentage of missing data did not change noticeably for the F-14 aircrew.
To examine whether the
distribution of daily activities
observed here is typical during armed

AIR FORCE
TRANSPORT AIRCREW

conflict, it can be compared to
simila data collected during the
Vietnam War on Air Force transport
aircrew (28). Tabled data from this
study have been plotted in Fig. 15 for
easy comiparison to Figs. 2 and 3.
The categories in Fig 15 are
comparable to those in Figs. 2 and 3
with the exception of "Ramp

WHER
4.9 h

D
WOR
.3 h

OTHER

Pounding' (waiting on the flight line).
Note that totai work time for these
transport aircrew was a little les
than one-half of the typical day,
which is similar to the pattern for
subjects in the present study. Not
surprisingly, tansport aircrew spent
more time flying in the average day
(6.6 h). They spent 4 h in the
average day on related duties (other
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6 .60 ..
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Figure 15. Average breakdown of sleep, work, and other activities
for US. Air Force C-141 transport aircrew flying 100 logistics
missions. (Adapted from data in Hartman (28)).

flight, ramp pounding, squadron
work), compared to about 10 h during Desert Shield and about 8 h during Desert Storm for the A-6 and F14 aviators. The amount of time spent sleeping in the typical day for the two groups is remarkably similar at
a little over 7 h. Thus, the pattern of daily activities of the aircrew inthis study, both before and during the
war, was similar in terms of amount of work and sleep to that for traavsport aircrew flying logistics missions
over 20 years ago.
Sleep patterns Yevealed that daytime flying resulted in earlier sleep onsets the evening before for
both squadrons in Desert Shield and Storm (Figs. 4-6). Evidently, knowledge of flying on the following day

resulted in earlier bedtimes the night before. On the other hand, nighttime flying pushed the peak of the
sleep fraction curve to 0800 (Figs. 4 & 5) and pushed mean sleep onset to abowt 0500 (Fig 6) for both
squadrons. This is an inevitable consequence of flying at night, but also an undesirable one. If continued,
this pattern of staying awake at night and sleeping during the day can lead *o circa•ian desyhronization--a
shifting of circadian rhythms with respect to local time. Furthermore, it ordinarily meus that the aircrew
will be sleeping only a short time before body temperature starts to rise and sleep becorwtes difficult to
prolong,. Interestingly, the expectation of shorter sleep periods following night flights was uot realized. We
will return to this fuiding later.
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Sleep duration after night flights during Desert Storm was shorter than before nonflying days but
still more than 6 h (Fig. 9). It was zimila to Jeep durations before daytime-flying days during Dc,;ert Storm
and both nonflying and daytime-flying days during Desert Shield. Average sleep duration never dipped much
below 6 h and very few individual sleep periods were less than 4 h (Figs. 7 & 8). With a minimum total
deep duration of 4-5 h recommended (7,26), obizIning adequate levels of sleep was not a problem for these
aircrew. in fact, a study of the sleep patterns of crew on the carrier USS KITTY HAWK almost 20 years
ago showed that the median duration for nintemrrupted sleep was about 4 h (29). On the other hand, the
longer sleep durations during Desert Storm before days without flights may indicate the stresses of combat.
Aircrew possibly took advantage of their schedules to catch up on sleep on these days, averaging about 8 h

per night.
The relatively few reported sleep problems (Pigs. 10 & 11), even for sleep periods after night flights,

data are coasistent with the major sleep period data in indicating
was an unexpected result. Thee subjective
that nighttime flying did not have a major negative impact on sleep duration, sleep need, deep trouble, or
restednes. Nap data are also consistent with these findings. The only substantial increas in nap frequency
was for A-6 aircrew during the war (Fig. 12). These naps also tended to be Longer (Fig. 13). We found no

concomitant increase in napp, ig after nighttime flights.
Why was there a pattern of apparently little deep-related fatigue for these AMERICA aircrew as a
result of combat? There are several possibilities. First, aircraft carrier use appeared to be well-managed.

Many assets were assembled in the theater of operation with dte naval air warfare load being shared by a
total of six aircraft carriers. This was an unprecedeed situation. The three carriers in the Red Sea rotated
such that at least two were on line at any one time, flying strikes The third could be off line, refuelling and
resupplya•n. Thus, the burden was not as heavy as it might have been had less assets been available to
military planners. For example, had the aircraft carrier USS INDEPENDENCE, which was in the area at

the start of hostilities, been required to bear the combat load entirely until other ships arrived, one might
expect a different result in terms of stress, fatigue, and sleep Loss.
unique to the USS AMERICA and its battle group
A CireadianExplwwtton. Other circansi
may have played a significant role in the lower-than-exwpected levels of sleep loss and fatigue. The experience
of aviators aboard USS AMERICA was different from that of aviators assigned to other aircraft carriers in
the operating area except for the aviators aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, which crossed the
Atlantic at about the same time and rate. A key factor may be that the USS AMERICA traversed seven
time zones and engaged in the war the day after reaching its station. Although ship clocks were reset for
each time zone, and many aircrew attempted to modify their work/rest schedules accordingly, adaptation to
local time by shipboard personnel was not likely to be rapid for several reasons. F15. , the ship's travel was
eastward. The phase-advance of the circadian pacemaker required by eastward travel results in longer
resynchronization times than the phase-delay required by westward travel (30). This is because the human
circadian rhythm has an endogenous period of about 25 h under typical circumstances. Consequently,
adjustments resulting in a shorter day (eastward travel) are more difficult than those resulting in a longer day
(westward travel). Second, the seven time zones were crossed in a period of only 15 d. Although phaseshifts of the circadian rhythm are often believed to take about I d for every time zone traversed, conditions
were not ideal for resynchronization. Exposure to the important zeitgeber ("time-giver") of sunlight appeared
to be minimal for many aviators. Life onboard a Navy ship does not necessarily include copious doses of
sunlight. Furthermore, recent evidence underscores the probable importance of zeitgeber strength on the
timing of the circadian system (31). Third, the nighttime flights with daytir~e sleeping started right after
arrival in the Red Sea. This served to delay wo. k/rest schedules from becoming synchronized with local
time.
If adaptation to local time was delayed, then aircrew were operating on a 'body time between local
this situation would work to the aircrewrs advantage. Flying at night
and EST. Because EST was 7 h e
and sleeping during the day would be an easier schedule to follow as it would correspond (on a time
schedule closer to EST) to flying during the evening and sleeping at night. To examine whether this situation
was likely, a suggestion was made (C. A. Czeislcr, personal communication, May, 1991) that work/rest
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patterns on the trip over to the Red Sea and during the war be plotted in raster format (32). In the present
context, raster plots are a means of closely examining any changes in the pattern of sleep, wake, and flying
periods over many days as the ship crossed the AWantic and became involved in the war.

• 7 i-Iforcing

Raster plots for representative subjects are shown in Figs. 16-19. The hotizontal axis is EST. The
vertical axis is study day. The first and last (partial) days of the study contained incomplete data so they
were omitted from these plots. Note that time along the h-rizontal axis Ls double-plotted. Each day (with
the exception of the first) is plotted to the right of and below the previous day. This means that the first
horizontal line of data contains study days 2 and 3. The next line also shows study day 3 with study day 4 to
its right. This technique exposes patterns in sleep or other activities that may bracket midnight without
these periods to wrap from one line to the nexL Solid black bars represent sleep periods; small

circles are flights. Blank space indicates activities other than sleep or flying Te jagged vertical line
*:••

beginning at 2400 represents local midnight Because the ship departed from Norfolk, Virginia, (EST), local

midnight and midnight ES initially coincided. As the ship travelled eastward, crosing meridians, local
midnight corresponded to earlier and earlier times EST. By study day 16, local midnight corresponded to

1700 EST, which was 7 h earlier than local midnight. The war started at approimmately the beginning of
study day 17, shortly after the ship's arrival in the Red Sea.
For many aviators there appear to be frequent attempts to adapt work/rea patterns to local time, as
Subject 08 (Fig,
evidenced by a general phase advance of the sleep periods on the way over to the Re
16) is representative of this pattern. With each dock adjustment, this subject continued to go to sleep
around 2400 (local) wtich corresponds to earlier and earlier EST slep onset times. It was not as difficult to
adapt one's work/rest cycle to time changes before the war when operational demands were fewer. Once
the war started, operational demands included increased night flights which pushed the work/rest schedule
back to one more consistent with EST. For example, the night 1lis on days 15, 16, 18, and 20 for subject
08 pushed sleep onset to 0400-0700 local time, but only 2100-2400 EST. Thes flights served to act agains
adaptation of the work/rest schedule to local time and perhaps keep the circadian clock set to a time closer
to EST.

-

A variant of the pattern described above can be seen in the data of subject 12 (Fig. 17). He showed
initial work/rest adaptation to local thne as evidenced by sleep onsets closely following the local midnight
line up until the war. Once this aviator starting flying at night (study day 20), he exhibited a forced delay in
sleep onset. Dalm 21 and 22 show a possible tendency to stick with a delayed deep onset (several hours after
local midnight) ,spite the presumed capability of sleeping at an earlier time. Following the night flight on
days 26-27, there appeared to be a concerted effort to deep at earlier and earlier times, thereby adapting to
local time. Full adaptation was again possibly delayed by the night flight on day 30, and possibly more after

-

the study ended.

IM: -After

A second pattern representative of many of the aviators is seen in the data of subject 16 (Fig. 18),
who tended to stay more closely on a work/rest schedule consistent with EST (at least up until study day 9).
This sleep trend may have been intentional, or perhaps he had difficulty adapting to the time zone changes.
some evidence of adaptation to local time from days 9-13, subject 16 shows a pattern of slipping back
to very late sleep onset times (locally) that correspond to very typical sleep onset times for zones closer to
EST. He tended to stay on a work/rest pattern closer to EST than local time despite a lack of night flights
forcing the shift in sleep/wake cycle that occurred for subject 08. This might be because he wasn't tired at
local midnight when it was only 1700 EST (or 1800 or 1900 in nearby time zones).
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A variant of the second major pattern i exhibited by subject 17 (Fig. 19), who showed some initial
variability in sleep onset time but tended to stay on a sdeep schedule consistent with EST. On days 17 and
19, night flights delayed deep onset. This subject appeared to finally establish a seep schedule consisttat

with local time on days 20-22. However, three consecutive night flights (days 24-26) served to deay leep
onset and resulted in apparent difficulty in returning to a sleep schedule consistent with local time. Subject
17 continued to go to seep well after midnight from day V through the end of the study.
The data to this point can be summarized as follows. The operational demands of the war meant
frequent night flights for A-6 and F-14 aviators. These flights served to push sleep onset times well past
local midnight. Despite this occurrence, the data described earlier show few indication of any associated
increases in fatigue and sleep problem& Why was there relatively little reported fatigue and difficulty
sleeping? Perhaps because the usually burdensome operational demands of nighttime flying, in addition to
the other factors listed above, delayed full and complete adaptation to local time. They did so by pushing
sleep onsets well beyond midnight locally, but much closer to midnight EST. This meant aviators were
perhaps continuing to operate on a body time closer to EST than the time zone in the northern Red Sem
Being synchronized to a time closer to EST would have the effect of making local night flights more like
evening flights according to the body's internal dock. Flights earlier in the evening are less physically
demanding because body temperature has not declined as far, and aviators are less sleepy. ess-thananticipated reports of fatigue and s•czp problems, therefore, may have been both a function of the less-than-

*

anticipated demands of this war o, the aviators in this study, coupled with the fact that aviators may have
been operating on a body time that gave them a decided advantage in flying and working during the local

night.
An additional posible source of support for this hypothesis can be found in the data. Ordinai*,
night flights would result in a reduction in duration for the immediately following szep period. This is
because the sleep pe1d would most likely begin near the trough of the circadian cycle in body temperature,
For subjects on self-sclected schedules in an environment free of time cues, bedtimes near the temperature
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cycle minimum were significantly shorter than those near the maximum (33). Wake times xended to occur
on the rising portion of the temperature cycle. In a study of unrestricted sleep in sAbjects kept awake for
variable periods, sleep duration was also shortest when started near the temperature minimum and occurring
largely on the ascevding portion of the body temperature cycle (34). As body temperature rises, sleep
b-.comes difficult to prolong. The failure to find the expccted reduction in sleep duration after night flights
in the present study may be due, at ieast in part, to the hypothesis that the flights took place on a body time
closer to EST. Figure 6 shows that sleep onset after night flights was only Z200 EST. Aviators who were
adapted to a time zone about midway between EST and local time would experience onset shortly after
midnight, corrfsponding to a typical sleep onset time before the war. Sleep fraction data also show a pattern
that would not be expected to be physically demauding on an EST or si-ia schedule (Figs. 4 & 5). The
peak in leep fraction is at 0300-0400 after night flights for a zone in between EST and local time. Again*
this is quite consistent with sleep fraction data before the war, with peaks at about 0400.
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Figure 19. Raster plot of the sleep, wake, and flight times of subject 17. See Fig. 16 for additional
details.
There is one piece of data that at first appears inconsistent with this explanation. Ouestion 5 on the
activity survey card asked subjects: "If you have flown durin this period, how s om after your last flight
could you have flown a strike?* The answers to this question are referred to as subjective strike delay (SSD)
and are analyzed in our companion report (24). It is interesting that, for both aircrew, SSD was longest
following night flights. However, we do not view this result as inconsistent with the hypothesis that local
night flights were more akin to evening flights on body time. A possible reconciliation lies in the fact that

night flights were the most difficult, dangerous, and stressful. Most combat missions were flown at night
while many less stressful missions were flown during the day (e€g., tanking). It is not surprising that, after
night flights, aircrew reported wanting lovger delays before flying again. However, the sleep period following
night flights, presumably coming at a good time in the circadian cycle, was relatively restful, restorative, and
long, as seen in the data above.
The extent to which the circadian factor played a role is impossible to determine without body
temperature data. Thus, the above hypothesis must be treated with caution. Even with this combination of
factors acting to delay adaptation to local time, adaptation should occur before very long after the start of
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the war. That is, sow,, adaptation would be expec~ed to occtjr during the 2 weeks the ship was crosn
meridians Just how much adaptation occurred can only be surmisd Nonetheless, several lines of evidence
iniaethat adaptation was not complete almost 2 weeks into the war and that this delay may have acted to
make the schedule-related dem~ands of the war less -.nallenging,
Wha: Jo these results mean to military planners? These data support the idea that, when possible,
ther
ma betangible advantages to incorporating information about tecrainpaeo
obtnsit
battle strategy. It is already known that during continuous operations performance is liely to follow the
diurnal cycle more than during normal work periods. As a result, low points in pedcfmanan e seem to
coincide with troughs in the circadian cycle (4). Taking advantage of circadian factors where transmeridian
travel is concerned, as on the USS AMERICA during the Gulf War, may help prepare combatants to fight at
subopitimal times This strategy zs particularly important for those who can Alwas be expected to fight and
work at night (eg., certain aviators, ground troops, and special forces). Due to the extensive amount of
shifworpeformd
i th Nav, crcaianprinciples (35) and sleep logistics (4,6,.7) cam be used to the
adatage of numerous naval personnel. The self-contained shipboard environment lends itself well to
manipulations of local time and work/rest schsedules that can benefit ship's crew. Further avenues worthy of
exploration include the more aggressive approach of intentionally shifting the phase of the circadian
pacemaker. Proper application of bright light is a proven means of phase-shifting the circadian dock (36-38),
even in tk&- voery operakioaltsiuaion of warned space flight (39). A complete considexatior-, of circadian
fiamtr holds the promise of niinibizng the predictable performance decline in military personnel who work
and fight when the bods natural tendency is to deep.
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